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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ILLEGITIMATES
IN THE AREA OF PARENTAL SUPPORT
R- v. R-, 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968)
An illegitimate minor and his mother brought an action for decla-
ration of parenthood and to compel the alleged father to contribute
toward the support of the child.1 The defendant father moved to dis-
miss, and this motion was sustained by the trial court. Missouri courts
had consistently held that, absent any statute, the common law im-
posed upon the father no obligation for support of his illegitimate
child.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that state ac-
tion which discriminates between legitimate and illegitimate children
in determining the right of a child to compel support from his father
is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 The Missouri Court found that this holding was com-
pelled by two recent United States Supreme Court cases.
These two cases concerned a Louisiana statute which limited re-
covery in wrongful death actions to legitimate or adopted relatives of
the deceased.4 In Levy v. Louisiana,5 an action on behalf of minor
1. R - v. R-, 431 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Mo. 1968).
2. R- v. R-, 482 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968); Heembrock v. Stevenson, 887 S.W.2d 263
(Mo. 1965); Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637 (1892). A Missouri statute made it unlawful
to neglect or abandon one's child in or out of wedlock; Mo. Rav. STAT. § 559.350 (1959).
This provision was repealed in 1965 but was replaced by a statute containing a similar
provision; Mo. Rav. STAT. § 559.353 (Supp. 1968). Prior to the repeal of the first statute,
however, the courts refused to consider the criminal statute as providing a basis for the
duty of support. See State v. White, 363 Mo. 83, 248 S.W.2d 841 (1952) (dictum); James
- v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963). See generally Christy v. Petrus,
365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
It is worth noting that only three states, Missouri, Idaho, and Texas, do not give
illegitimate children a statutory right of support from their fathers. Note, Liability of
Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L. RaV. 859, 860
(1966); Comment, 30 Mo. L. Rav. 154, 155 (1965).
3. R- v. R-, 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968).
The principles applied by the United States Supreme Court would render invalid
state action which produces discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren insofar as the right of the child to compel support by his father is concerned.
Under the guise of discouraging illegitimacy, states no longer cast the burden upon
the innocent child.
Id.
4. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (Supp. 1967). The statute has been construed as not
allowing recovery by illegitimate relatives. Finn v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 141
So. 2d 852, 878-79 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
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illegitimate children was brought to recover for the wrongful death
of their mother. In Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insur-
ance Co.,6 the mother sought to recover for the wrongful death of her
illegitimate son. In each case, the lower court found recovery was
barred by the statute. The United States Supreme Court reversed
these decisions on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
discrimination against illegitimates in wrongful death actions.7
The Missouri case appears to be one of the first state court decisions
based on Levy and Glona. Two major questions are raised by these
three decisions. The first, concerning the validity of the Missouri de-
cision, is analytical: does the holding in this case inevitably follow
from the Supreme Court's decisions, or is there a relevant distinction
to be made between a common law support action and a statutory
wrongful death action which would limit to the latter the equal pro-
tection prohibition against discrimination between legitimates and
illegitimates? The second question is more speculative and concerns
the implications of these decisions. There are other areas of the law
in which illegitimates are treated differently than legitimate offspring.8
Do the Levy and Glona decisions make inevitable the end of all dis-
crimination against illegitimates, or are there some circumstances
under which discrimination on the basis of legitimacy will not be held
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause?
5. 391 US. 68 (1968).
6. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
7. In the Levy case, Mr. Justice Douglas said that illegitimates are clearly persons within
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also stated:
While a state has broad power when it comes to making dassifications . . .. it may
not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular
class. ... Though the test has been variously stated, the end result is whether the
line drawn is a rational one .... Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation
to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother.
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968).
In the Glona case, Mr. Justice Douglas, again speaking for the majority, said:
Yet we see no possible rational basis ... for assuming that if the natural mother is
allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegit-
imacy will be served. . . . To say that the test of equal protection should be the
"legal" rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal
Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such "legal" lines
as it chooses.
Glona v. American Guar. S. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
8. For a brief description of the plight of the illegitimate, both in historical and con-
temporary terms, see Note, Rights of Illegitimates under Federal Statutes, 76 HIARv. L.
REv. 337, 337-38 (1962). The old common law view that illegitimate children deserved no
recognition at all has been under attack. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great
Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. R v. 829, 842-45 (1966).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss4/4
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I. THE ANALYTICAL PROBLEM
The Supreme Court has often stated that the Equal Protection
Clause is not a bar to classifications of different groups;9 classifications
which do not constitute invidious discrimination are permissible.10 In
order to make a determination of invidiousness, it is essential that the
court look to the purpose of the law."1 If the discrimination bears some
rational relation to the purpose of the law, and if that purpose is the
accomplishment of a proper legislative policy, the Court will usually
allow it.12 Mr. Justice Douglas restated this test in Levy v. Louisiana:
While a State has broad power when it comes to making classifi-
cations . . . , it may not draw a line which constitdtes an invidious
discrimination against a particular class .... Though the test has
been variously stated, the end result is whether the line drawn is
a rational one.' 3
Thus, in Levy, the Court struck down the discrimination between
legitimates and illegitimates because it could find no rational relation
between the exclusion of illegitimate children and remuneration for
the wrongful death of the mother.' 4
In the child support situation, the central question is, once again,
whether the discrimination between legitimates and illegitimates bears
some rational relationship to the purpose of the support action.Y5 In
Missouri the distinction between legitimates and illegitimates in the
area of rights and duties of child support stems not from statutory
mandate, but is a product of the common law.'0 The purposes for
which illegitimate children are permitted to maintain a support action
against their parents are two-fold: to provide some means by which
9. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell,
294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-9 (1911);
Tussman & tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. RFv. 341, 343 (1949).
10. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962).
11. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. Rxv. 477, 484-85 (1967);
Tussman & tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 366 (1949).
12. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-9 (1911); Krause, Equal Protection for the
Illegitimate, 65 McHI. L. REv. 477, 484-85 (1967).
13. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
14. Id.
15. Discovering purposes of laws or procedures is not always a simple or clear process.
For an article that has explored some of the complexities in this determination, see
Tussman and tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rv. 341 (1949).
16. See note 2 supra.
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the child's welfare can be protected,17 and to do so at a minimal cost
to the state.' 8 In light of these purposes, there appears to be no rational
basis for the distinction between legitimates and illegitimates made by
the prior Missouri case law.
The main rationale for not allowing an illegitimate to compel sup-
port from his father is historical. Although at common law the ille-
gitimate was not recognized at all, Missouri common law places the
duty of support on the mother. In addition, the courts now protect
the illegitimate's rights where he has been given some specific right
by legislative enactment.19 It would seem that discrimination based
solely on history has no relevance to, and conflicts with, the purposes
of support-providing for the welfare of individuals in a way least
burdensome to the state.20 Where it is legally possible to compel sup-
port for an illegitimate child from the father as well as the mother,
there are two private sources of support for the child, and the likeli-
hood of the state having to support the child out of public funds will
diminish. It would thus seem that the application by the Missouri
Supreme Court of the equal protection standard enunciated in Levy 21
and Gloia- was proper.
II. THE SPECULATIVE QUESTION
There remains to consider the extent to which the standards set and
holdings enunciated in these cases will be extended. The question at
issue is whether there are any areas in which discrimination between
legitimates and illegitimates is not devoid of rational purpose and
would not be prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. The bulk of
17. Note, Rights of Illegitimates under Federal Statutes, 76 HP-v. L. Ry. 337, 353
(1962).
18. Id. at 352.
19. State ex rel. Canfield v. Porterfield, 292 S.W. 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927); Easley v.
Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637 (1892). The Missouri rationale is not at all uncommon. Many
other states look to the historical discrimination as the basis for distinguishing between
rights of legitimates and illegitimates. E.g., State v. Miller, 3 Del. 518, 52 A. 262 (1902);
State v. Byron, 79 N.H. 39, 104 A. 401 (1918); People v. Fitzgerald, 167 App. Div. 85,
152 N.Y.S. 641 (1915); Creisar v. State, 97 Ohio St. 16, 119 N.E. 128 (1917).
20. One author makes the point that an illegitimate child, in terms of support, is
situated similarly to a father's children by a previous marriage and the law compels
support in such a case. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. Riv.
477, 500 (1967).
21. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
22. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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discrimination against illegitimates occurs in two areas; welfare law
and inheritance.2 Therefore the possible impact of these decisions in
these two areas will be considered.
A. Welfare
In talking about the applicability of these decisions in the area of wel-
fare laws, it might first be helpful to delimit the category of such laws.
One author lists the following laws under the category of welfare:
statutes enacted for the protection of public health, liquor control
legislation, statutes enacted for the public safety, death statutes, work-
men's compensation statutes, laws regulating employer-employee con-
tracts, legislation providing for the care of the poor, statutes granting
pensions to public officers, old age pensions and social security legis-
lation, curative acts, conservation laws, statutes regulating public elec-
tions, and statutes pertaining to national defense.24 Both wrongful
death and support25 are within this category.
There are certain unifying purposes to these welfare actions and
laws. They were designed to deal with pressing social problems which
were not being dealt with adequately without government interven-
tion.2 6 Certain of these actions, such as support, wrongful death and
workmen's compensation, were designed to care for the individual
welfare in a relatively inexpensive manner in order to prevent greater
difficulties for the society as a whole .27 These purposes are virtually
the same as the purposes of the laws or procedures discussed earlier
in relation to the United States and Missouri Supreme Court decisions.
The implication is clear: in the area of welfare laws there seems to be
no reason for limiting remedies to legitimate offspring only; in fact
this historical discrimination defeats the purposes for which the laws
were passed.28 At least in the area of welfare laws, discrimination be-
23. Another author does not make these same groupings but rather lists five categories:
support; inheritance; custody, visitation and adoption; father's name; state and federal
welfare laws. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 478-82
(1967).
24. 3 J. SuTrimumD, STATUTORY CoNsTRucrioN 396-97 (3d ed. 1943).
25. One case specifically refers to support as an area of welfare legislation. Armijo v.
Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d 721, 440 P.2d 471 (1968).
26. 3 J. SUTHmu.AND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 396 (3d ed. 1943).
27. Note, Rights of Illegitimates under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REv. 337, 388,
352-53 (1962).
28. See Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash. 2d 721, 440 P. 2d 471, 474 (1968).
Justice Douglas in Levy and Glona disposes of one of the traditional reasons for dis-
criminating against illegitimates, that such discrimination discourages illegitimacy. Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 US. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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tween legitimate and illegitimate offspring bears no rational relation
to the purposes of such laws. It follows that such discrimination is
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
Significant strides have already been taken in eliminating discrimi-
nation in this area.- 9 The Missouri wrongful death statute"° seems to
allow for recovery by an illegitimate offspring. The Missouri Work-
men's Compensation Act clearly allows for recovery by illegitimate as
well as legitimate offspring.31 Discrimination between legitimates and
illegitimates often arises from state court interpretations of "child."
The interpretation of state statutes is crucial because of the way in
which federal courts have dealt with federal statutes in which the word
"child" has been used. Generally they have followed the definition of
the state in which the case was presented when no federal guidelines
were evident.3 2
B. Inheritance
The other major areas of discrimination against illegitimates is in-
heritance3 3 -in cases of intestacy and construction of wills. In terms
of the Equal Protection Clause, the important question is whether
discrimination against illegitimates bears any relation to the purposes
involved in the distribution of a decedent's property.
If one assumes that the basic guideline of distribution of property is
the dead person's probable intent, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that he would prefer that his property pass solely to his legitimate rela-
tions.31 The laws of intestacy as well as judicial constructions of the
29. 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION 343 (3d ed. 1943).
30. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 537.080 (Supp. 1968). Not all states are free of discrimination in
the area of wrongful death. E.g., L. T. Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddil, 49 Ind. App. 40, 94
N.E. 411 (1911); Andrzejewski v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 158 Wis. 170, 148 N.W. 37 (1914).
31. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.240 4(b) (1949). Some states follow the Missouri procedure.
Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 Tax. L. REV. 829, 856-57 (1966). Others do not. E.g., Bell v. Terry &
Trench Co., 177 App. Div. 123, 162 N.Y.S. 733 (1917).
32. Comment, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 984, 985 (1967). One article contains an extended
discussion of this problem with regard to particular federal statutes. Note, Rights of
Illegitimates under Federal Statutes, 76 HARv. L. R-v. 337 (1962).
3. The common law rule with regard to inheritance by illegitimates is the same as was
mentioned in connection with the welfare discussion. E.g., Bent's Adm'r v. St. Vrain, 30
Mo. 268 (1860); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R.I. 459, 137 A. 881
(1927); Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act
on Legitimacy, 44 Tax. L. REv. 829, 854-56 (1966).
34. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 501-502 (1967).
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word "children" are based on this assumption. 85 Because there is a
rational relationship between the purpose of the statute-i.e., a not
irrational way of justifying discrimination against illegitimates-such
discrimination could probably be allowed even in the face of a chal-
lenge based on the Equal Protection Clause.30
Even if it is admitted that there are other considerations in the dis-
tribution of property besides the intent of the deceased, discrimination
against illegitimates might still stand in the face of an equal protection
challenge. Legislatures draft intestate succession laws with a view
toward the support of the deceased's dependents, as well as to give
effect to his probable intent. Thus, such laws may be said to have cer-
tain welfare aspects. If it could be assumed that the sole purpose for
laws of intestacy were to insure the support of the intestate's relatives,
there would be no ground for distinguishing between welfare and in-
heritance statutes; the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment
would apply to both. This assumption would be difficult to justify,
however, and since only discrimination devoid of a rational basis is
prohibited, the "intent of the deceased" aspect of intestacy laws almost
certainly provides a sufficient basis to sustain the discrimination.
To say that discrimination on the basis of legitimacy in the judicial
construction of wills and the laws of intestacy does not offend the
Equal Protection Clause as a general matter is not to condone the prac-
tice in all cases, however. Assuming that the probable intent of the de-
ceased should be an important factor in such constructions, the disturb-
ing fact is that the supposed probable intent-in fact, an educated
guess by courts and legislatures-may not correspond with actual in-
tent. Yet this assumption of probable intent to disinherit illegitimates
is given much weight in the distribution procedure.
The above considerations suggest that the foundation of discrimina-
tion in this area is somewhat shaky. A new approach with a double
aspect would avoid needless and unfounded discrimination: (1) when
it is possible by any reliable means to find the actual intent of the dead
person, that intent should be given effect; (2) when it is not possible
to ascertain such intent, the principle that devolution of the property
is to be determined by some ficticious intent imputed to the decedent
35. See Tuttle v. Woolworth, 74 N.J. Eq. 310, 77 A. 684 (1908); Krause, Equal Protection
for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 502 (1967).
36. One state seems almost to have foreseen this possibility. A Maryland statute states
that illegitimates and legitimates should stand on equal footing in all areas except in
"matters of inheritance, descent or distribution of real and personal property. . . ." MD.
ANN. CODE art. I § 16 (1957).
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should be abandoned. In the latter event, other policies would be con-
sulted to decide who should take. It does not seem necessary that a
judicially constructed "dead hand of the past" should exert such sway
over property distribution.
The law in the area of inheritance has not been static since common
law days.37 Two states have completely abolished distinctions between
legitimates and illegitimates. 3 Missouri 9 and several other states40
have allowed illegitimates to inherit through, as well as from, the
mother. In spite of these advances, however, it would seem that the
illegitimate's rights to inherit property are far from being equal to
those of legitimate offspring in most jurisdictions. Further, it appears
that illegitimates must await legislative change to be placed on com-
plete parity with their legitimate counterparts.
CONCLUSION
The Levy and Glona cases gave notice that the Supreme Court was
willing to place discrimination on the basis of legitimacy under scru-
tiny. The principles enunciated in those cases create doubt in assessing
the validity of this practice in other areas of the law. R ...... v.
R ...... may be a harbinger of a new wave of litigation which will
clarify these questions. The area of welfare laws appears especially-sus-
ceptible to attack by illegitimates. However, in the case of inheritance,
where discrimination is arguably related to the purpose of the statutes
and instruments construed, equal qrotection arguments may be of no
avail. In the absence of legislative reforms, it may be hoped that courts
will begin to apply more liberal rules of construction which correspond
more closely with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
37. Two articles discuss in considerable detail the extent to which the different states
allow illegitimates to inherit. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A
Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829, 854-56 (1966); Note, Illegiti-
macv, 26 BROOKLYN L. R. 45, 67 (1959).
38 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206(A) (1956); ORE REV. STAT. §§109.060, 111.231 (1957).
39. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 474.060 (1959). Cases have followed this section or its earlier
equixalents. This section is said to give illegitimates complete inheritable blood so far
as the mother is concerned. Martin v. Claxton, 308 Mo. 314, 274 S.W. 77 (1925); Hahn v.
Hammerstein, 272 Mo. 248, 198 S.W. 833 (1917); Moore v. Moore, 169 Mo. 432, 69 S.W.
278 (1902); Dyer v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391 (1877); Bent's Adm'r v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo. 268
(1860); Baker v. Stucker, 213 Mo. App. 245, 248 S.W. 1003 (1923).
40. E.g., Smith v. Garber, 286 Ill. 67, 121 N.E. 173 (1918) (illegitimate children could
inherit if such was the intent of the testator); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin,
48 R.I. 459, 137 A. 381 (1927); Wasmund v. Wasmund, 90 Wash. 274, 156 P. 3 (1916).
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